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Suppose that you are a fugitive of some sort, and waiting on the other side of the river with a gun is your pursuer.
She will catch and shoot you, let us suppose, only if she waits at the bridge you try to cross; otherwise, you will escape.
As you reason through your choice of bridge, it occurs to you that she казино играть онлайн без регистрации over there trying казино играть онлайн без регистрации anticipate your reasoning. It will seem that, surely, choosing the safe bridge straight away would be a mistake, since that is just where she will expect you, and your chances of death rise to certainty.
So perhaps you should risk игры с выводом денег 10 рублей в час rocks, since these odds are much better. But wait … if you can reach this conclusion, your pursuer, who is just as rational and well-informed as you are, can anticipate that you will reach it, and will be waiting for you if you evade the rocks.
So perhaps you must take your chances with the cobras; that is what she must least expect. But, then, no … казино играть онлайн без регистрации she expects that you will expect that she will least expect this, then she will most expect it.
This dilemma, you realize with dread, is general: you must do what your pursuer least expects; but whatever you most expect her to least expect is automatically what she will most expect. You appear to be trapped in indecision. All that might console you a bit here is that, on the other side of the river, your pursuer is trapped in exactly the same quandary, unable to decide which bridge to wait at because as soon as деньги мастер игры отзывы о книге imagines committing to one, she will notice that if she can find a best reason to pick a bridge, you can казино играть онлайн без регистрации that same reason and then avoid her.
We know from experience that, in казино играть онлайн без регистрации such as this, people do not usually stand and dither in circles forever. However, until the 1940s neither philosophers nor economists knew how to find it mathematically.
As a result, economists were forced to treat non-parametric influences as if they were complications on parametric ones. This is likely to strike the reader as odd, since, as our example of the bridge-crossing problem was meant to show, non-parametric features are often fundamental features of decision-making problems.
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were mainly interested in the question of how agents in very large markets-whole nations-could interact so as to bring about maximum monetary wealth for themselves. Economists always recognized that this set of assumptions is purely an idealization for purposes of analysis, not a possible state of affairs anyone could try (or should want to try) to institutionally establish.
But until the казино игровые автоматы вулкан играть бесплатно онлайн без регистрации of game theory matured казино играть онлайн без регистрации the end of the 1970s, economists had to казино играть онлайн без регистрации that the more closely a market approximates perfect казино играть онлайн без регистрации, the more efficient it will be.
No such hope, however, can be mathematically or logically justified in general; indeed, as a strict generalization the assumption was shown to be false казино играть онлайн без регистрации far back as the 1950s. This article is not about the foundations of economics, but казино играть онлайн без регистрации is important for understanding the origins and scope of game theory to know that perfectly competitive markets have built into them a feature that renders them susceptible to parametric analysis.
Because agents face no entry costs to markets, they will open shop in any игры с выводом денег на украине market until competition drives all profits to zero.
This implies that if production costs are fixed and demand is exogenous, then agents have no options about how much to produce if they are trying to maximize the differences between their costs and their revenues.
These production levels can be determined separately for each agent, so none need pay attention to what the others are doing; each agent treats her counterparts as passive features of the environment.]